THE New Republic

Frank Talks About India's Inner Crisis by Jawaharlal Nehru

PAGE 7

Who Makes the Decisions in the White House?

BY FREDERIC W. COLLINS

★

The Day of Mourning . . . . . *Alexander Kendrick*

Harry Truman's Self-Portrait . . . *Gerald W. Johnson*

THE IMMATURITY OF OUR ASIAN POLICY

II-Military Illusions . . . . . *Hans J. Morgenthau*

MARCH 19, 1956

20c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire .... T.R.B.

Don't take too seriously the Gallup Poll's preliminary Ike versus Adlai trial run which gave an enormous 2-to-1 lead to Ike. It was taken before Ike declared himself, at the height of national sympathy and drama, and represented a condolence note rather than a realistic appraisal. Four years back Gallup also ran a hypothetical poll, March, 1952, of "Ike versus Truman" with Ike also ahead 2-to-1, just as now. But by October, 1952, with reality in the picture, Gallup was giving Ike only 51 percent to Adlai's 49 percent. Somehow his polls, we notice, tend to lessen GOP odds as reality approaches.

Kefauver will be hurt badly if he doesn't win the New Hampshire primary handily this week and Adlai will suffer similarly if he doesn't win Minnesota next week. These may be crucial tests. Both are entering modest advance alibis. The fact is that Estes has campaigned personally in New Hampshire, Adlai hasn't. Estes campaigned personally in 1952 (when Truman didn't) and won a surprise victory (Kefauver 19,800; Truman 15,297); if he doesn't do as well now he will suffer.

Newsweek, March 12, gave the exclusive news that Ike might dump Nixon and give him a Cabinet post. It can be reported here, from knowledge, that the first hint of the affair came from Nixon himself—and from a deeply dejected young hatchet man who knew exactly what Ike's unction meant. It has been said in Washington that this Administration has reservoirs of unction that it hasn't even begun to touch yet. Now the top members of the team are beginning to use their unction on each other. Ike's ambiguous benediction on Nixon at last week's press conference seemed to some like the application of extreme unction. Ike explained that Nixon might not be a Vice Presidential candidate, but anyway he was a "comer"; the question is whether Dick is a "comer" or a "goner." Ike, it appears, isn't going to tell him till August. What a fate: to be stuck in a revolving door for five months! Anyway we can be sure of one thing—there will be lots of unction.

Here is another inside story that illustrates the difficulty of running a government under present conditions. On March 5—a Monday—the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out the latest version of the Bricker Amendment, 11 to 2. State Department authorities looked it over and found its restrictions on Presidential treaty powers less brusque but just as bad as in the first version. All day that Tuesday the Department subordinates worried. Dulles was away. Ike had a press conference next day. Could they get to Ike before the press conference in time to prevent his giving an easy endorsement to the proposal? For Ike bestowed his blessing on the original Bricker Amendment only to have to withdraw it later on when he had finally been briefed. Ike now is surrounded by a protective circle grimly determined to spare him every possible anxiety and worry. Could the underlings break through this Sherman Adams coral reef? Fortunately they did, but the situation gives an idea of what is likely to happen any time an emergency develops.

It can't be said with certainty yet whether the Democrats can prevent a general crack-up in their party over civil rights. Moderation was the keynote after the Supreme Court's unanimous decision on school desegregation. But now this mood is changing. Southern Congressmen every day are taking a sterner stand. They are occupying fixed positions from which it will be harder to budge. Now comes the George "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" signed by 81 Southern House members and 19 Senators, charging the high court with substituting "naked power for established law."

The Liberal-Dixiecrat union in the Democratic Party may become unworkable. Everyone knows that the South has co-operated with the GOP in this Congress to form a center coalition. Eisenhower has not been attacked by the conservative Democratic leadership. Conservative John L. McClellan (D., Ark.) rather than liberal Albert Gore (D, Tenn.) becomes chairman of the Senate lobby investigation. A Senator like James Eastland becomes Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. A Representative like Graham Barden (D., N.C.), Chairman of the House Labor Committee, picks a former NAM lobbyist named James Brewbaker as Committee Counsel. The Southern conservatives ram through the natural gas "giveaway" bill in defiance of the Democratic majority in House and Senate; this aids Ike through his veto. But why should the Southern conservative bloc care who wins the Presidency? Many of them would prefer Ike to a Democrat. What they want is enough votes from Northern Democrats to let them control Congress and the committee chairmanships as they do now. Take this issue of a civil-rights plank in the party platform. If voter dissatisfaction in the North over failure to implement such a plank knocks off a liberal Democrat, why some Southern Congressman advances just that much faster by gaining "seniority" up the ladder to a committee chairmanship.

Notes: One of the big issues of this campaign may be the irresponsibility of the American press; newspapers show even greater bias at the start than in the past. . . . The Democratic National Committee had difficulty finding an advertising firm bold enough to handle its account. . . . Tax exemption for small campaign gifts probably will go through Congress, but $100 seems too much under the graduated income tax; as Sen. Richard Neuberger points out it would give $91 exemption to a man with income over $200,000, only $20 or less for the poor man. . . . Five dollar tax exemption seems wiser. . . . General Motors can try to laugh it off but word has gone out that it's too big; it faces antitrust trouble if it doesn't lop off extraneous branches like bus manufacture, refrigerator manufacture, or credit-financing. . . . Eighteen million Negroes now have spending power of $16 billion annually; that's the great new lever that is changing the racial picture of the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Backing Away From Further Foreign Aid

PARADOXICALLY in 1956, when Communists have made widespread use of economic aid for the first time, the American foreign aid effort is in greater jeopardy than at any time since 1948.

There are many reasons. Most conspicuous is the failure of the Administration to present a clear picture of the 1956 perils in Asia and Africa, and show how the aid program can help.

Since 1954 the aid program has been adrift. Harold Stassen proposed a bold, coherent program for the "Arc of Asia" from Pakistan to Japan, but the proposal was cut to a mere $200 million within the Eisenhower Administration, and Congress reduced that by half. In 1955 the Russians unveiled their new trade-and-aid offensive, but so far the Administration has come forward with no new target.

Secretary of State

Secretary Dulles, for example, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24 that the Free World position is stronger in Asia today than it was a year ago. On March 1 Mr. Dulles told the House Ways and Means Committee that he was unable to predict a need for more American aid. He said when the President speaks of "more flexibility" in the aid program he means we should combine our efforts with those of other countries, and thus save money. And when the President speaks of a need for "greater continuity" in the aid program, Mr. Dulles said, he means that other countries can count on our help over a longer period of time and thus do not need so much in any one year.

President Eisenhower was asked at his press conference on March 7 whether he thought the new economic accent in Soviet policy would require a revaluation of our foreign policy. He replied:

> The US must study this matter carefully so that we don't get into a position of just responding to specious promises of the other side, and throwing our substance all over the world, but at the same time have a logical, solidly followed program that our friends can believe in.

Again, accent on the negative. He offered no program. Nor has any spokesman for the Administration.

Among Democrats in Congress there is for the first time since 1948 not a single leader speaking out in defense of foreign aid. Sen. Walter George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has actually led the sniping against the aid program, and been joined by Democratic Senators Richard Russell and Mike Mansfield. Even Sen. Theodore Green (D, R.I.), a long-time friend of the aid program, returned from an Asian trip in January with a blast at mistakes he had uncovered.

Part of their criticism is directed at the present Republican administrator of foreign aid, Mr. John B. Hollister, who has sneered at his own agency in Congressional testimony, and has set something of a record among major Washington administrators in telling Congress he has ben unable to find out what goes on within his staff.

Public attitudes in support of foreign aid, surprisingly, appear well in advance of the Federal Government views. A poll of Iowa voters taken by Sen. Tom Martin (R, Iowa) showed 69 percent favored continued economic aid, a slightly higher percentage than those favoring military aid. A similar poll conducted by Rep. Harrison Williams, Jr. (D, N. J.) showed overwhelming support for "President Eisenhower's long-term aid proposal."

In the business world there has apparently been a significant shift of feeling about foreign aid, following the Russian trade drive. The Committee for Economic Development issued a policy statement in mid-February calling for substantially greater effort by the US to stimulate economic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The report was signed by such men as the president of Standard Oil of California.

No doubt there are business leaders who believe that any aid program which strengthens foreign economies will in the long run produce ruinous competition for the US. This view is strong in the cotton textile industry and has recently been voiced by the textile workers unions. Pressures by the cotton industry unquestionably contributed to the lack of enthusiasm among Southern Democrats for the aid program this year.

Like so many other critical issues in Washington, the outcome of the aid battle depends largely upon the vigorous leadership of Mr. Eisenhower, which for understandable reasons he has not yet found it possible to provide.

Disarmament Talks

WHEN Harold Stassen, as President Eisenhower's representative, sits down at the new series of UN disarmament talks in London which begins on March 19, he will be empowered to extend the discussion beyond the rigid limits which hampered the New York talks last September.

Secretary of Peace

No longer will President Eisenhower's "open sky" proposal be unrelated to subsequent measures for disarmament. The best information in Washington is that Mr. Stassen will present details of the new American proposal for a halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and that he will further discuss an American cutback in conventional military personnel. He may support also the British proposal for a limited try-out of the open-sky inspection system, in East and West Germany, or a similar area.

President Eisenhower unveiled the American proposal to stop manufacture of nuclear weapons in his recent letter to President Bulganin, which read in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part: "The US would be prepared to work out . . . arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world could no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive materials."

Russian delegates may point out that such a freeze in stockpiles would benefit the US because we have the larger reserve — an estimated 10,000 American bombs of all types, against about 1000 Russian bombs. But in fact both countries have a sufficient supply to deter war, or to deliver a devastating counter-attack. The saturation point may have been reached.

The President's offer to cease manufacture is conditional on Russian acceptance of the open-sky inspection system, hence the discussion is again thrown back to the impasse of Russia's rejection of the President's proposal.

The "force level" which Harold Stassen is prepared to accept for the conventional troops of the US is higher than the 1.5 million which the Soviet Union, Britain and France have accepted in the past, but lower than the present US military personnel. The Soviet Union will attack this figure as a retrogression in the talks, but Mr. Stassen will nevertheless be in a stronger position than he was at the last meeting—when he could not negotiate at all. The US will no longer seem to oppose disarmament. This is progress, though the hard core issue remains the Russian refusal of inspection.

The "International Socialist" in Both Parties

WHEN the President announced his availability for another term, Mrs. Garvin "Bazey" Tankersley, niece of the late Col. Robert R. McCormick, warned that those who had hoped for "Nixon, Jenner or Knowland" at the head of the GOP ticket now feel "free to work with Southern Democrats, and we may be able to throw the next election into the House of Representatives." This is less a spectre than a spectacle. Themselves weakened and dispersed, the far Right Republicans can now only grab at the coattails of Sen. James O. Eastland's advancing white supremacy Right.

Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, national director of "For America," political vehicle of the Taftite irreconcilables, frankly concedes that "we've got mighty little next to those fellows." Although "For America" keeps up appearances with a paper network of Southern branches, the group's Dixie co-ordinator, 54-year-old Texas cattleman J. Evetts Haley, does most of his co-ordinating with Eastland's Federation for Constitutional Government. Haley attended the Federation's December sessions in Memphis, but the only significant Southern strength he represented was in his own Texas, where his supporters include oil millionaires H. L. Hunt and Hugh Roy Cullen.

On the basis of its present strength, "For America" appears to be a significant election factor primarily in such Midwest centers of Taft's old power as Illinois and Indiana. There politicians may pay some attention to the group's November plans to run separate slates of electors, pledged to shun both major party Presidential candidates. But these efforts can dent the national outcome only if the Eastland forces join in a close-knit common strategy. At this point "For America" seems to be striking out on its own.

The separate elector plan is the pet project of Clarence Manion, former Notre Dame Law School dean and a leading advocate of the Bricker amendment to limit the President's treaty-making powers. Under the Manion elector plan, voters mobilized by "For America" would not vote for a major party Presidential candidate. Instead, they would vote for electors, every one of whom, Manion declares, "will be an American patriot pledged to vote in the Electoral College for a President whose single interest is preservation of the national sovereignty, the financial solvency, and the strict constitutional government of the United States. Conceivably, these all-American electors may find such a President among outstanding pro-American statesmen who will have been deliberately passed over by the international socialist managers of both party conventions."

Resort to the device of separate electors has been threatened on and off in the South since 1944. But there are no present indications that the anti-segregationists yet have any united November plan in mind—or even that when they do decide what to do, after the Democratic Convention, their decision will have any relation to what Dean Manion is up to.

Southern Democrats

LETTERS and telegrams from angry constituents have been piling up in the offices of Southern Congressmen and Senators. "We're acting down here to halt integration," they declare. "What are you doing to help us? The Declaration on Integration, signed by 100 Congress-

THE New Republic A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1826 JEFFERSON PLACE, N. W. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

Michael Straight, *Editor*
Gilbert A. Harrison, *Publisher*
Helen Fuller, *Managing Editor*
Selig S. Harrison, *Associate Editor*

F. R. Ruskin, *Administrative Assistant*
Lucille Davis, *Copy Assistant*
Irvin Shapiro, *Design*

Robert Evett, *Book Editor*
Eric Bentley, *Theatre Critic*
Delmore Schwartz, *Poetry Editor*

Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1956 in the USA by New Republic, Inc. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00; Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00.

Vol. 134, Number 12, Issue 1256

Washington Wire, by T.R.B. 2
Behind the Headlines 3
Frank Talks About India's Inner Crisis 7
by Jawaharlal Nehru
Who Makes the Decisions 8
by Frederic W. Collins
South Africa's Day of Mourning 11
by Alexander Kendrick
Military Illusions 14
by Hans Morgenthau
Books and Comment 17
Psychiatry 23

Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses, and, if possible, wrapper with stencil impression.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men is their half-hearted response.

Three lawyers, Richard Russell of Georgia, Sam Ervin of North Carolina and John Stennis of Mississippi wrote the first draft. In further conferences held in Senator George's office, moderates such as Senator Fulbright softened its terms. If anything the third draft, the published version, is notable for its restraint. Thus its closing phrase is an appeal to fellow Southerners "to scrupulously refrain from disorder and lawless acts."

The Declaration will be often cited with some justification by Republicans as further evidence of the incapacity of the Democratic Party to govern the United States. It will be widely used against Democrats who seek election outside the South. It must therefore create new bitterness and disunity among Democrats. And yet among the 19 Senators who signed the Declaration no more than three would join a separatist Southern party this year. At least 12 of the 19 are moderates who bow to Southern prejudice only when they are cornered. Twenty-nine Southern Representatives and three Senators, Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore refused to sign. Their action points up the fact that while mobs riot in Tuscaloosa, one half of the 208 tax-supported white colleges and universities in the South have opened their doors to Negroes.

No Rest for Benson

CONGRESSIONAL leaders recall no daffier situation than the two farm bills which House and Senate are asked to compromise. In 1955 the House voted to restore 90 percent support prices for basic crops. In 1956 the Senate eliminated the 90 percent supports but substituted the Eisenhower soil bank plan.

These two bills now go to a Conference in which all five House members and 3-out-of-5 Senate members are in favor of 90 percent supports. They will readily agree to combine the two programs. But the White House staff plans to put the heat on the House to reverse itself on 90 percent supports. Last year's vote was only 206-201.

If the House does not reverse itself, some Republicans in the Senate are privately proposing to block any farm bill this year, in order to avert a Presidential veto which would hurt Republican candidates in the farm belt.

Blowing Up the Bridges of Conciliation

Montgomery, Alabama

GOV. JAMES E. FOLSOM's tardy plan for an Alabama biracial commission is being chloroformed in the Legislature, and the Interracial Committee of the Co-ordinating Council of Birmingham has been attacked by a states' rights organization for offenses which smack of "Communism." What are some of these offenses? The Interracial Committee has a Negro secretary; it has urged the city government to employ Negro policemen; it has sponsored unsegregated meetings on a college campus to advance understanding.

Meanwhile at the University of Alabama the Board of Trustees has moved to make justice seem impartial. It expelled Autherine Lucy for charging conspiracy between the University authorities and the mob. Now it has suspended four students for participation in the riots and expelled one, Leonard Wilson, for speeches to White Citizens Councils in which he made "unwarranted and outrageous public attacks" upon the integrity of the president, faculty and officers of the university. Wilson had challenged the trustees to expel him.

It should be noted that the University has not yielded to demands for the identification of students and professors who signed a petition for the readmission of Autherine Lucy. Agitation for this disclosure has come from a Tuscaloosa white council which, according to its vice-president, is convinced that "professors are stirring up new racial tensions." It is also embodied in a legislative proposal. Observers expect voluntary resignations from the faculty, if not soon, then later. Intellectuals never too much at home in the Deep South are currently far from comfortable.

The mass trial of 90-odd Montgomery Negroes, including more than 20 ministers, is to be held during the week of March 19. The accusation is conspiracy to bring about the boycott of the city busline. It is generally believed that, conditions being what they are, these men and women will be found guilty, if the cases are pressed that far. But one hears of uneasy consciences among Montgomery leaders. They know that convictions will not stand up on appeal.

At the very time when whites and colored moderates most desperately need to meet on the level and part on the square, there are fewer and fewer bridges across the widening gulf.

Must racial discord continue at white heat? Is there no balm in Gilead? None, until time and circumstance will have dulled the edge of Southern resentment. Mere condemnation from the outside will not further a process of adjustment. Nor will mere persistence in resorting to the courts help much. The hour has come for diplomacy, for restraint which has not lost sight of the national goal of full freedom for all Americans, without regard to color or previous condition of servitude.

The Unbroken Chain of Court Decisions

THE SUPREME COURT has affirmed a lower court order requiring the University of North Carolina to admit three Negro boys for undergraduate study. Although this is the first involving undergraduates, it seems well within the principles announced in earlier Court decisions; it is consistent also with the later court action instructing the University of Florida, over the university's protest to admit a Negro to its law school.

Issued without opinion and without full briefs or oral argument before the Court, the order is of the type used by the Court when it regards the law governing the case as completely settled. In this instance, there is no reason to doubt this.

In a series of cases running back to 1950, four years before the public-school desegregation decision of 1954, the Court has consistently upheld the rights of Negro suitors to attend unsegregated state-supported institutions of higher learning. As a result, Negro graduate students have been in attendance at state universities in all but four Southern states. A federal court order is already outstanding requiring the admission of Autherine Lucy, and other Negroes similarly situated, to the University of Alabama; and except in this Alabama case, the process has been carried out without incident.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brinkmanship as Played by the Soviet Union

LIGHTS have been burning late in Middle East offices of the State Department but little light has been shed on the problem of how to head off an Arab-Israeli war. For the prevailing US view is that neither Arab nor Israeli leaders will intentionally permit any border incident to set off a war at present.

Israeli army ground forces remain more effective than all Arab armies combined; and though Egypt's new air force, boasting Soviet jets, could seize and hold control of the skies, neither side could win a war without appalling losses.

But behind this deadlock, admittedly temporary, lies a Soviet trap which the American Government considers as threatening as the danger of war, and which helps explain the shipping of US tanks to Saudi Arabia, the withholding of arms from Israel, and our calmness over the ousting of the British military commander by the Kingdom of Jordan.

Soviet strategy, as US policy makers see it, is to isolate the Arab states from the free world by whipping up an Israeli crisis—a brink of war situation—in which Soviet arms, loans, advisers, and technicians would move in on the side of the Arabs; Soviet votes or vetoes in the UN would play their part; Egyptian Premier Nasser would build Arab unity around ultra-nationalist, anti-Israeli elements in the six Arab countries; and the US might co-operate, Soviet strategists hope, by rushing arms to Israel and withdrawing economic aid from Arab countries.

Confronted with this Soviet strategy, the US has chosen not to be trapped. It has, on the contrary, pushed through the Aswan dam project for Egypt; it has withdrawn arms for Israel; and it has thus far avoided giving offense to Arab nationalists who control the fabulous reserves of Middle East oil, without which, military authorities contend, the free world would not successfully defend itself in any major war.

Britain's Reaction to Another Slap in the Middle East

London,

THE DISMISSAL of Glubb Pasha from the command of the Arab Legion in Jordan is the most humiliating defeat the British have had in the Middle East since the war. No salt has been spared to inflame the wound, for Glubb's fall was clearly timed to coincide with the visit of Selwyn Lloyd to Egypt. Indeed the British Foreign Secretary had just parted from Colonel Nasser apparently on the friendliest terms, when he heard the news.

Another war between Israel and the Arab States is only one of the explosive possibilities. The young and vacillating King Hussein has said that "the Jordan Government continues to preserve and respect the 1948 treaty with Britain," but it is doubtful whether these words have any value. King Hussein has bought a little time by dismissing his father's trusted friend, but nothing suggests that he is really in charge of the situation. It looks as if the mob has taken over in Jordan and the danger is that chaos in that country may spread to other parts of the Middle East. It is a frightening prospect. Britain still has scattered troops in Jordan, as she has elsewhere in this area, and they may be slaughtered to a man if the mob gains control. Britain would then find herself committed to an unpopular adventure just when she can ill-afford it.

What is surprising is that the British had so little inkling of what was happening, even though the warning signs were as bright as neon lights. Men of the Arab Legion recruited in the towns, as distinct from the Bedouins, refused to obey orders in the recent riots. For weeks the King had gone out of his way to insult Glubb. A short time ago, for instance, when King Hussein received the gift of 12 Vampire fighter aircraft from Britain, Glubb was not among the distinguished guests. He was packed contemptuously into the watching crowd at the back. Gnome-like and chinless —called "little chinless father" by his men—Glubb is one of those devoted and Cromwellian figures who have done so much to create and maintain the British Empire. What undermined him was not any personal arrogance but the wicked yeast of nationalism, with its accompanying hatred of Israel.

The Jews were quite wrong to think of Glubb as their enemy. He could not be expected to look upon the advent of Israel with favor, but he was consistently against Arab extremism and time and again refused to allow his men to be sent in raids against Israel. Indeed, that is one of the reasons why he fell. To the nationalists, inflamed by the refugees who poured across the Israeli frontier after the victory of the Jews over the Arabs, he was not only a symbol of British Imperialism. He was a man who was preventing the night of the long knives. The Egyptians, who have been drunkenly stirring up strife, had an even larger stake. Glubb Pasha stood in the way of the Egyptian ambition to create a united Arab army under Egyptian leadership. Arab hotheads are already talking about a war with Israel in the summer.

Now that the British have got over the first shock, an angry feeling is growing that America is very much to blame. The State Department, it is argued, was responsible for foisting the ill-conceived Baghdad Pact upon the British, and it is the Baghdad Pact that has sparked off the crisis. American oil interests are said to have been intriguing against British interests in the Middle East for years, and it is also noted that America has been sending arms to Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia, with Egyptian help and encouragement, has been pouring money into Jordan with the object of inflaming public opinion, American policy is naturally resented. No wonder the Russians are chuckling. Their arms are piling up in the docks at Alexandria, their experts are arriving in Cairo; the opportunities for mischief would seem to be limitless.

HUGH MASSINGHAM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Frank Talks about India's Inner Crisis

WHEN Prime Minister Nehru of India speaks out, what makes news in the West is usually a fragment torn out of context. Thus disembodied, Nehru's pronouncements on world affairs sometimes strike Americans as preachments aimed exclusively their way. He speaks primarily to his own people, crusading against the linguistic, caste and religious divisions which weaken Indian nationalism—divisions increasingly preoccupying Indian leaders since the Bombay language riots in January. In the essay printed in part below (Nehru's introduction to *Four Phases of Culture*, by Hindi-language poet R. D. Sinha Dinkar, just published) he lectures not to the West but to his countrymen, displaying introspective national self-criticism rare in prime ministers. Nehru's message may seem diffused to American readers, but in India, its warning is unmistakable: narrow loyalties of the past must submit to a new discipline or "we shall crack up."

THE FACT that India was for long a closed land gave it its peculiar character. We became as a race somewhat inbred. We developed some customs which are unknown and not understood in other parts of the world. Caste, in its innumerable forms, is a typical product of India. Untouchability, the objections to inter-dining and inter-marriage, are unknown in any other country. The result was a certain narrowness of outlook. Indians even to the present day find it difficult to mix with others. Not only that, but each caste tends to remain separate even when they go to other countries. Most of us in India take all this for granted and do not realize how it astonishes and even shocks the people of other countries.

We developed at one and the same time the broadest tolerance and catholicity of thought and opinion, as well as the narrowest social forms of behavior. This split-personality has pursued us and we struggle against it even today. We overlook and excuse our own failings by reference to the great thoughts we have inherited from our ancestors. But there is an essential conflict between the two, and so long as we do not resolve it, we shall continue to have this split-personality.

In a more or less static period these opposed elements did not come into conflict with each other much. But as the tempo of political and economic change has grown faster, these conflicts also have come more in evidence. In the atomic age we are compelled by overwhelming circumstances to put an end to this inner conflict. To fail to do so is to fail as a nation and lose even the virtues that we have possessed.

We have to face this crisis of the spirit in India, even as we have to face great political and economic problems. The industrial revolution is coming rapidly to India and changing us in many ways. It is an inevitable consequence of political and economic change that there should be social changes also if we are to remain as integrated human beings and as an integrated nation. We cannot have political change and industrial progress and imagine that we can continue unchanged in the social sphere. The stresses and strains will be too great and if we do not resolve them, we shall crack up.

The picture of India as we see it, in the first millenium after Christ and indeed even before that, is very different from its later appearance. We see in those early days an exuberant, vital people, full of the zest of life and adventure, carrying their message to far countries. In the realm of thought, they dared to scale the highest peaks and to pierce the heavens.

Then come the later centuries when a process of decay sets in. Our thoughts become largely a repetition of what has been and the creative spirit grows less and less. We become afraid of adventure either of the body or mind, and we develop the caste system and a closed-in society. We talk still in the highest terms, but we act differently.

It is extraordinary how our professions run far ahead of our practice. We talk of peace and non-violence and function in a different way. We talk of tolerance and construe it to mean our way of thinking only and are intolerant of other ways. We proclaim our ideal, that of a philosophic detachment even in the midst of action, but we act on a far lower plane, and a growing indiscipline degrades us as individuals and as a community.

When the Westerners came here across the seas, the closed land of India was again thrown open in a particular direction. The modern industrial civilization gradually crept in in a passive way. New thoughts and ideas invaded us and our intellectuals developed the habit of thinking like British intellectuals. That shaking up and opening out was good in its own way and it began to give us some understanding of the modern world. But this cut off these intellectuals from the mass of the people who were little affected by this new wave of thought. Our traditional thinking was displaced and those who still clung to it did so in a static and uncreative way, totally unrelated to modern conditions.

Now this faith in Western thought is itself being shaken and so we have neither the old nor the new, and we drift not knowing whither we are going. The younger generation has no standards left, nothing to direct their thinking or control their action.

This is a dangerous situation and if not checked and improved, is likely to lead to grave consequences. It may be that we are passing through an age of transition, political, economic and social, and these are the inevitable consequences of such a period. But in the atomic age no country is likely to be given many chances to correct itself, and failure may well mean disaster.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Inside the White House

Who Makes the Decisions

by FREDERIC W. COLLINS

WE NOW HAVE Mr. Eisenhower's own word that as a recovered heart patient, he will conduct the Presidency in a different way through the rest of his tenure, including a second term if he is re-elected. "In many cases," he said, after cataloguing great areas of Presidential concern, "these things can now be done equally well by my close associates." In his first three and a half years, before a shadow lay across his health, he had already introduced significant changes in the method of operation of his office. It is fair to assume that when he leaves it, the Presidency will be something other than what it was when he took it. On his own words and on the pre-coronary record, it may be expected that in the remainder of his regime, there will be a reliance on the staff system and on delegation of responsibility quite new to American experience. Whether this is good or bad, whether the people want the Presidency altered in that way, is certainly one of the great underlying issues of this election. One feels it will be decided not at the level of surface drama, on catch-phrases like "part-time chairman of the board," but deep down in instinct.

To say that the country is going to have even more of the staff system, and even more delegation of responsibility, is to say that the inherent disadvantages of those methods are to be present in greater measure. Having in mind the normal procedures of American politics and government, the greatest disadvantage is diffusion of responsibility, making it difficult if not impossible for the electorate to assign credit or assess blame for executive acts and policies. It is a phenomenon of the present, attributable only to a measure of blind infatuation in the popular devotion to Mr. Eisenhower, that he gets off scot-free even when his government is in trouble, as in the farm areas. A second disadvantage is lack of co-ordination in the government, especially visible in foreign policy.

In the Eisenhower Administration, these disadvantages are aggravated by special circumstances. One is the addiction of the Secretary of State to tourism. The other is the recurrent physical dispersal of the top echelons of government during Mr. Eisenhower's rest periods away from Washington.

FREDERIC W. COLLINS *has covered Washington, D. C., since 1942 as correspondent for the* Providence (*Rhode Island*) Journal.

A third disadvantage, arising principally from zeal for the staff system, is a sort of drying out of the human substance of government. To borrow a passage from Tocqueville's discussion of the Old Regime (in an admittedly irrelevant context):

> No doubt many of these men had proved themselves highly competent in the exercise of their functions and had a good grasp of all the details of public administration; yet, as for true statecraft—that is to say clear perception of the way society is evolving, an awareness of the trends of mass opinion and an ability to forecast the future— they were as much at sea as any ordinary citizen.

It is perhaps worth noting that when Dulles was asked on February 24 about the weakness of the current government in France, he cited by way of reassurance the indestructibility of the French administrative system.

EXCEPT in rare instances, no outsider knows who in the White House or in the government at large is responsible for a given decision, however diligent his inquiry, and the prospect now is that those instances will become even more rare. The exceptions usually occur when the President exercises his final authority in a dramatic last moment, as in the case of his veto on intervention in Indo-China and on hasty mainland involvement opposite Formosa. Indeed, the general public has almost no acquaintance with the men in the White House and in departmental office below Cabinet rank who are making decisions or contributing to them. They are, in fact, unknown even in Washington. Consider how much excitement would be aroused if one remarked on the street or at a party, "There's Andy Goodpaster." Yet, as nearly as can be established, Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, staff secretary, is third in line in the staff system, just below General Wilton Persons, retired, who is deputy to Sherman Adams, the assistant to the President, and chief of staff.

Adams, of course, is known by reputation. He does a superb job in performing an indispensable function as an auxiliary lobe on the Presidential brain. Yet the scope of his activity and influence, let alone independent power, defies precise measurement. He rules a staff divided by function among men handling the press, Congressional liaison, departmental liaison, Presidential appointments, speech-writing, preparation of documents, legal questions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and day-to-day economic questions. To name these functionaries would be to compile a list of persons almost completely unknown to the public, except for James C. Hagerty, press secretary. In the staff structure there are additional functions in the field of politics, patronage, and contact with "minority groups," but they do not appear on the charts. One of Adams' special jurisdictions seems to embrace the so-called independent agencies. Alongside Adams' domain, formally known as the White House Office, there is another, the Executive Office of the President, which takes in the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Budget Bureau, and the Office of Defense Mobilization. Next door is a company of special assistants, wrestling with disarmament, foreign economic policy, atomics, federal-state relations personnel, foreign trade policy and disposal of agricultural surpluses. A new man has just joined up, William H. Jackson, to "co-ordinate foreign affairs."

There is still the Cabinet. Theoretically, it is not a decision-making body. The Eisenhower Cabinet, however, is a special group of men, in that most of them are serving at financial sacrifice, and most of them were too accustomed to great power in their private careers to be unduly bemused by the power attaching to public office. For those reasons, there is unquestionably a minimum of self-interest in their judgment. Aware of that, this President is said to rely on his Cabinet for advice more than have most Presidents. Appended to the main body are a sub-cabinet, a sub-sub-cabinet and a changing pattern of ad hoc committees.

THE foregoing summary description of the executive structure brings to mind one of the great faults arising from its over-elaboration. Except to political scientists, it is about as boring a subject as can be found in the whole field of government and politics. It has absolutely no political sex appeal. Because it is so uninteresting, the public has no knowledge of it, and, that being the case, there is no way of making it a good political issue. Bit by bit, the authority of the President can be absorbed into an impersonal, institutionalized apparatus. The process can be carried so far that not even the staff personnel are sure "who" should take credit or blame. A "what" becomes the substitute for "who," and a "what" is almost inaccessible to popular inquiry and influence. In the end, the appeal of the President's personality becomes a separate and dominant factor in politics, dissociated from the record of the government he heads.

In the Eisenhower Administration, the impersonality and remoteness of the human element in government is accentuated by the immurement, partly voluntary and partly not, of its people. When a man vanishes into the White House or the Executive Office building at eight a.m., he is not likely to be seen again until he goes home and gets into bed with his brief case. This is known as dedication. Instead of going out to luncheon and mixing with the populace, the staff members dine with one another at the White House, with heaven knows what results in the in-breeding of thought. Members of higher planning and policy groups, formerly gregarious, are seen no more in outer society, and are actually under strict injunction to be careful in their contacts. This is for security's sake. Sherman Adams is up at dawn and a-bed with the chickens.



The White House Chain of Command

So, who makes policy? Evidently, Sherman Adams contributes greatly to it. His influence seems to vary among the different departments, according to their importance in policy and the strength and independence of the individual department heads. But his closeness to the President and his function as a co-ordinator give him great opportunities to make his thinking felt. When he is co-ordinating two conflicting points of view, he can blend them into a new, different, Adams point of view. As nearly as one can learn, Mr. Eisenhower does not want choices presented to him, but rather, an agreed recommendation. When one comes along with the Adams endorsement, it comes pretty close to being home safe. When it is necessary for the President to make a choice among recommendations, the one favored by Adams is said to have the advantage.

Who made the new farm policy? What was the Eisenhower contribution, beyond finally endowing it with his authority? To ask that question is to state the broad issue of where the center of responsibility lies in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Administration. One or two things are known. When it was finally recognized that there was real trouble in the farm belt, the formulation of a program to meet it was taken out of the hands of the officer having primary responsibility, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Benson, and assigned to a Cabinet committee—plus Adams—on which Benson was only one member. That step is said to have been initiated by Adams.

It is a useful exercise to compare the recent veto message on the gas bill with a report made a year ago by a Cabinet committee on fuel and energy policy. With respect to natural gas, the report was anti-regulation, as was the body of the veto message. The difference is that somebody stirred some politics into the message. Question: Who was it, or, perhaps, who were they? Speculation opens up fascinating vistas. One of the few men around the President with real experience in politics, intensive though relatively brief, is the Vice President. Did Richard M. Nixon, of California, home of the Superior Oil Company, advocate the veto? Did he concur in someone else's advocacy? Did he resist? The answer is not available to current history.

THERE is more than theory behind the proposition that diffusion of responsibility is inherent in the present executive system. There have been several episodes in which it was demonstrated with remarkable clarity, and in one or two episodes, there has been extraordinary rejection of responsibility at the top.

When the sorry performance with respect to the Salk anti-polio vaccine became an issue, the President bucked the responsibility to Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, who promptly bucked it to a defenseless bureaucrat, Dr. Leonard Scheele.

When General Matthew Ridgway challenged the President's 1954 State of the Union assertion that military policy had unanimous support in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President bucked responsibility for any error in his statement to the Pentagon. Men who have been in Washington since Herbert Hoover's time were astounded. They had never before heard a President pass off responsibility for his own words.

There have been two examples of exceptional administrative disarray in the conduct of foreign policy. Both occurred while the President and Secretary of State were out of town, a fact which carries its own commentary on the soundness and effectiveness of the executive organization. One occurred last spring, when Chou En-lai, at Bandung, made a move for talks between Red China and the United States. The other, very recent, had to do with the shipment of tanks to Saudi Arabia. Both times, as it happened, the two principals were Mr. Hagerty and Under-Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr.

The Chou En-lai statement broke on a Saturday morning, Washington time. There were telephone conversations between Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hagerty. There was then a statement by the Department of State having the practical effect of rejecting Chou's offer out of hand. Sen. Walter George raised his organ voice in dissent in a speech that night. By the first of the week Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower were back in town, and by mid-week they had succeeded in reversing the Hagerty-Hoover policy. But to this day it is a question, even among diplomatic correspondents, where the responsibility lies for the Saturday morning boner, which could have been extremely serious.

The performance on the tanks was almost a re-enactment of the springtime flub. Again it is impossible to assign responsibility. It is a fact that Hagerty alone talked face to face with the President before the short-lived embargo was ordered. It is a fact that foreign affairs do not lie within Hagerty's area of special competence. It is a fact that Mr. Hoover, called before the Senate Foreign Relations Commitee,, and acting in the most manly fashion in accord with a Scout's code of honor, accepted full responsibility. (And it is somehow symbolic that during this ordeal, Mr. Dulles left Mr. Hoover's side and took a place in the spectator seats). But these facts do not add up to a satisfactory conclusion as to who was really responsible. It is believed in Washington, for example—but not known—that Zionist leaders got in touch with someone at the White House as soon as the story on the tank shipment broke. It could have been Max Rabb, the "minority contact" on the Eisenhower staff. It is supposed that the White House person telephoned Hagerty. But the public has no really solid information about all this, and for that matter, as far as the public record shows, neither does the Foreign Relations Committee.

It should not be forgotten that in neither of these cases was responsibility placed on Mr. Eisenhower. That is how the staff system and the delegation of responsibility work.

THERE is no legitimate basis in his career or in his make-up for the apprehensions sometimes voiced that Mr. Eisenhower, as a "recovered heart patient" serving a second term, would permit the Presidency to degenerate into a mere ceremonial office. While allotting some of his former concerns to his associates, he said, "in others I shall continue to perform these important tasks." It seems inevitable, however, that the Presidential function is to become more and more restricted to decision, and that decision will become restricted to a narrowing field of highest policy matters. By 1960, should he win re-election, the phrase, "Eisenhower Administration," may have become rather markedly imprecise, too broad for the actuality, and what has traditionally been a central reference point of American politics may have undergone a disquieting loss of meaning and usefulness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Africa's Day of Mourning

by ALEXANDER KENDRICK

THE Act of Union, South Africa's Constitution, which brought Briton and Boer together 47 years ago, was laid in its grave at Capetown this February 27. Outside Johannesburg City Hall that afternoon 300 women stood silently, with bowed heads, around a large banner which read in Afrikaans and English, "Die Grondwet Vernietig—The Constitution Destroyed." The banner bore a black sash of mourning and so did each of the women.

Other black-sashed members of the Women's Defense of the Constitution League demonstrated in Pretoria and outside the House of Assembly in Capetown. When Prime Minister Johannes Strijdom emerged from the House he shied away from the women, nodded nervously to some of his gathered supporters, and hurried to his waiting car, although a few minutes before, safe inside the confines of the Parliament, the "Lion of the North" had been exultant, almost in prize-ring fashion, as he celebrated the greatest victory of his own career and of unqualified racism in South Africa.

For the passage of the South Africa Act Amendment Bill, by eight votes more than a two-thirds majority, was a notable success for the supporters of White Supremacy, which they prefer to call Apartheid. The bill amends the 1909 Constitution by removing the full franchise from 40,000 Colored (persons of mixed race) voters of the Cape province (South Africa's only non-white voters and only a small portion of the country's one million Coloreds) and places them on a separate roll so that they can no longer take part in general elections.

The bill then goes on to assert the sovereignty of Parliament and denies the right of the courts to review parliamentary acts.

Whether the Joint Parliamentary Session's 174-68 vote for the amendment resolves the constitutional struggle of the last five years, as the Nationalists jubilantly declare, remains to be seen. There are signs that the real fight is just beginning.

For the Nationalist victory was won by consummate political trickery. Strijdom heads a minority government. It is only a peculiar clause in the same 1909 Act of Union, giving rural areas more seats for fewer votes, that has enabled the Nationalists with their up-country and platteland Afrikaner support, to obtain a parliamentary majority, although they polled a minority of the popular vote in the last two elections.

The Nationalists put through various Apartheid measures with this parliamentary majority, notably in the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951, but all were overruled by the courts. So last year Strijdom enlarged the appointive Senate from 48 to 89 seats, in order to obtain a two-thirds majority in a joint session, and it was this session which has now repassed the Separate Representation of Voters Act as a Constitutional amendment, and in the same bill tried to make its action court-proof. Meinherr Strijdom is no fool. At the same time as he packed the Senate he also took the precaution of packing the Supreme Court with five new Nationalist members. So the opposition United Party's action in taking the amendment issue to court does not frighten him.

Nevertheless Strijdom and his followers appear to be frightened men. Although in Parliament they exude confidence, and in debate are vicious and brutal to their opponents, although their praise of White Supremacy is loud and fervent, although they seem to have the situation well in hand and boast that they are riding the crest of the wave, there are indications that their latest victory may be a pyrrhic one, and indeed the Joint Session may be recognized by history as the turning point in the sad and dismal chronicle of this divided and uneasy nation.



Johannes Strijdom

For one thing, the Nationalists have unified the opposition as never before. Even as the Amendment Act was being passed, a large private meeting was being held in Johannesburg, bringing together the representatives of half a dozen opposition political parties, and several direct-action groups, notably the Torch Commando of a few years back. The meeting was frankly dedicated to the purpose of turning the rascals out, but it is not divulging its plans yet. There is a good chance, however,

---

ALEXANDER KENDRICK, *London correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System, has just returned from a five-months assignment in the Union of South Africa.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



"Black Sash" women, in mourning for the South Africa Constitution, march through Capetown in a silent demonstration against the plan to take the franchise from Colored voters.

that it may now be possible to join together various parties and thus give an infusion of new blood to the pale and polite United Party, which heads the official Opposition. Perhaps even more important, some agreement can be attained as to objectives. The weakness of the Opposition is that it was content merely to oppose, and has proposed no alternative or even adopted a tangible policy on the color question.

It is fairly certain, at any rate, that there will be more direct-action opposition in the future. The Black Sash movement has shown the way. The day after the Strijdom victory, a large gasoline fire was set on the steps of the Supreme Court in Johannesburg, the Jolly Roger was hung over the door, and a poster with a flaming cross—a brand-new symbol in South Africa—proclaimed:

> The Nationalist Government, through the Senate Act, has usurped power. A despotic government has used this power to destroy the Constitution. The Government has forfeited the allegiance of the people. In the name of liberty, awake!

In addition to increasing opposition from without, the Nationalist Government is now also finding itself beset by defection in its own ranks. There has been a slow but steady disaffection as the result of the Strijdom group's excesses. Several notable Afrikaner professors, editors and clergymen have broken with the Apartheid program.

The latest of these is also the most important. He is Dr. B. B. Keet, head of the Dutch Reformed Church's seminary at Stellenbosch University. Dr. Keet has long been the guardian of the Afrikaner ideological fountain, for the church and the university represent the twin main sources of Apartheid nationalism. Yet in his new book, *Suid Afrika Waarheen? (Whither South Africa?)* Dr. Keet declares that Apartheid is an escape from Christian duty. "Let us acknowledge openly," he writes, "that Holy Writ, both the Old and the New Testament, draws no dividing lines or walls between the races."

The government also has lately become aware of, and alarmed by the deleterious and isolating effects of its Apartheid policy abroad. The rest of Africa and the world are going in one direction, South Africa the other.

The Prime Minister and the Finance Minister have appeared before audiences of American businessmen in Johannesburg, pleading for better understanding and more foreign investment, since a large part of invested capital has recently been withdrawn from a country regarded as unstable.

In the realm of human relationships, as well as in the realm of politics, there are evidences that Strijdom's future path may be a rocky one.

Opposition is growing, for example, to the cruel and totalitarian treatment being accorded to many people under the new Population Registration Act. Scores of non-European families, classified as Colored, have been racially reclassified by the Director of the Census. This does not mean that they are ever given a higher classification, namely to European, but only a lower one, to Native. Such reclassification means an end to present living quarters, employment, educational facilities, friends and other "privileges" in this highly stratified society. It can be especially tragic for teen-age children.

THE Minister of Education has announced his intention to introduce Apartheid in the university system, and a truly elaborate Apartheid. It is not enough for Whites and non-Whites to be segregated, but separate universities are planned for Europeans, Indians, Coloreds and several of the Bantu tribes. The Association of African Students has opened the new term by entering the lists against the Minister of Education. The European students are quick to recognize that they themselves will be the chief sufferers from curtailed facilities.

Similarly, the government's plan to institute Apartheid in the labor unions has brought a quick reaction of opposition, and some trade union leaders are beginning to think in terms of a new political party as well.

Father Trevor Huddleston, the Anglican priest who has been a one-man anti-Apartheid movement in the disgraceful Johannesburg slums of Sofiatown, and who has just been withdrawn to England after 12 years (most South Africans believe some sort of pressure was applied somewhere) summed up the psychological disability of the Opposition in his farewell appearance before the Johannesburg Progressive Association, recently formed to combat Apartheid:

> The greatest weakness in South Africa today [he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

said] is the failure of those who know the right to bear witness to what they know. It is now considered a good thing to conceal your profoundest convictions lest their revelation create discomfort or even persecution.

Remove the Western Areas and call it slum clearance—then you can sleep the sleep of the just. Deprive thousands of men of the right to sell their labor in the best market, and call it Influx Control. Cut out the school-feeding subsidy and tell the world that the African can now expand his own educational facilities to the utmost limit.

And, he might have added, take away the vote and call it only an amendment, introduce deportations in the form of zoning laws, propose labor restrictions under the name of Industrial Conciliation, and pass off the most virulent and arbitrary racism since Hitler as Registration of the Population.

The solace of nomenclature is perhaps no more insidious in South Africa than elsewhere, and it is only one of the reasons for insufficient activity by the Opposition heretofore. Another is frankly recognized but seldom spoken about.

The Apartheid fight has become an engagement not only between different ideologists, but between different languages, Afrikaans and English, and between two different nationalities, Boer and Briton. The British still have an inferiority complex over the Boer War and although practically every Englishman here is an anti-Nationalist, they fear to become too deeply involved in a struggle that the unscrupulous and irresponsible Nationalists would undoubtedly present in "brave little Boer" terms.

THERE is reason to believe that the violent 14-day debate on the Constitutional amendment has caused a general revulsion of feeling that will dissipate a large share of the political apathy customarily known. Allowing for the peculiarities of unbridled Afrikaans speech, the debate as conducted by Strijdom and his Ministers achieved a ranting, bullying, mocking tone of personal invective such as has not been heard in any parliament in years. Again the most striking parallel is with Hitler's Germany.

The Prime Minister, during the course of the debate, completely rejected for all time the possibility that any African can obtain full citizenship rights in this country. He declared, "There is no middle way" and one must be "either on the side of those who want to preserve the future of the White Race, or not." He declared that mere civilization is not the criterion for political democracy in South Africa, but only blood.

In his final remarks before the passage of the amendment, Meinherr Strijdom, raising his eyes to Heaven, prayed in a hoarse whisper for all Whites to stand together. "Out of the depth of my soul," he said, "I call on all Europeans in South Africa not to tell non-Europeans that we are their enemies. But Europeans can never call in the non-European as an ally." He waved his arms about his head and declared, "In Heaven's name do not let this happen in South Africa. Our descendants and our Christian conscience will not allow it."

Strijdom talks like that and, it is conceded, he even thinks like that. But his attitude is so uncompromising and offers so little hope for racial peace in the land that, as stated before, debate on the South Africa Act Amendment may mark a turning point.

Moreover, despite all the oratory about White Supremacy and the need for preserving the White Race, the plain fact is that the amendment's only achievement is to take away the franchise from 40,000 Coloreds who normally and naturally had voted against the Nationalists. If, as one Johannesburg editor remarked, the Coloreds had voted for the Nationalists, South Africa might have been spared a great deal of constitutional anguish.

TWO distressing aspects of the South African situation impress themselves upon a visitor. One is that the race question is a miasma that hangs over every single aspect of life here, and nearly every conversation. A mixture of guilt and shame poisons the atmosphere and spreads a national malaise.

The other tragedy is that whatever can be done to improve things will have to be done with four-fifths of the population sitting on the sidelines. The non-Europeans, Native, Indian and Coloreds, have taken virtually no part in the constitutional battle, although, it is true, the United Party's court test of the amendment is being taken with a group of Colored voters as appellants.

The sad truth is that the non-European population is also badly split on this and other questions. One element has always held that the Colored franchise on the common role was specious, anyway, so it cannot logically object to its abolition. Another element, centered in Natal, wants to secede from the Union anyway, so it cannot find anything but sympathy for a parliamentary action injuring the Union.

But the principal reason for non-European inactivity is simply fear. There are too many ways in which a Native or Colored can end up in jail.

Nevertheless, since they are the victims of the successive encroachments of the Apartheid policy on the democratic principle, it cannot be said that the country's non-Whites play no role, or take no interest in what is going on. They are fully aware of the simple fact that if Meinherr Strijdom's Nationalists constitute only a minority of the White population, all the White population put together constitutes an even smaller minority of the people of South Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy—II

Military Illusions

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

OUR POLICIES in Asia are irrelevant to the political problems confronting us. At best, they are ineffective, as are our propaganda and economic policies. At worst, the political damage they do is out of all proportion to whatever intrinsic merits they may have; this is true of our military policies.

Our military policies in Asia owe their existence to the shock of the Korean War. The North Korean attack demonstrated the need for local military defenses wherever a similar attack was likely to occur. Our commitment to defend South Korea, Formosa and South Viet-Nam meets that obvious military requirement. However, the Korean War gave rise to a broad interpretation of the Asian problem in primarily military terms. The North Korean attack was interpreted to have been planned by the Soviet Union as the opening move in a series of military aggressions likely to occur anywhere in Asia. The Soviet Union was believed to have changed radically its policy from peaceful penetration and subversion to open warfare. If that interpretation was correct, a corresponding shift of our policies was obviously in order.

Yet that interpretation was intrinsically implausible at the time and has been discredited further by subsequent events. The evidence, both intrinsic and explicit, points strongly toward a different interpretation. According to it, the Russian role in the outbreak of the Korean War was one of acquiescence rather than of instigation, resulting from a miscalculation of our intentions and capabilities. However, our military policies have never recovered from the shock of that original assumption of Communist determination to launch military aggression at any time anywhere in Asia. Our military policies remain oriented toward this assumption. They have taken two different forms: in our rearmament policy for Japan, and our alliance policy in South Asia. In both instances the military advantages have been negligible, while the political results have been disastrous.

The only legitimate military interest we have in Japan is the availability of air bases. Whatever Japan will do to increase that availability must be welcome to, and supported by, American policy. Thus we must welcome and support Japanese measures of internal security. However, over-all rearmament of Japan, with which our policy has identified itself, does not meet that test. For no contingency can be visualized which would require the traditional armed forces of Japan to protect our bases. These traditional forces would be useless as defense against an atomic attack, and Japan is protected against an invasion by the threat of American atomic retaliation and not by whatever traditional forces she could put into the field. As far as Japan herself is concerned, the availability of our air bases rests primarily not on military but on political foundations. It is exactly these political foundations that our rearmament policy tends to undermine.

For rearmament is unpopular in Japan. It is so *per se* and as an instrument of American policy. Japan has drawn from World War II the lesson that militarism does not pay, especially when you are on the losing side. Rearmament and militarism are largely equated by the popular mind, and since militarism stands for defeat, devastation and degradation, the shadow of these stigmas falls upon rearmament as well. For many Japanese, impressed in particular by the pacifist provisions of the MacArthur constitution, democracy in turn has come to mean disarmament, peace and a new deal.

Japanese Response to Rearmament

Thus it is not by accident that the democratic and pro-American elements of the Japanese population oppose rearmament while the conservative and reactionary forces, potentially hostile to the United States, support it. Some support it half-heartedly and cynically as a means for getting the American forces out of the country. Others support it as a symbol of national sovereignty. Still others—at present a small minority—favor it as the instrument of an independent foreign policy.

One attitude unites both the foes and friends of rearmament: the bewilderment and resentment at the about-face of the United States. Defeat and occupation made a deep impression upon the Japanese mind. The Japanese were ready to follow the lead of, and imitate, a nation whose victory had proved its superiority in war and whose occupation policies seemed to prove its politi-

HANS MORGENTHAU, *director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, has just returned from a tour of the Far East. This is the second of four articles on our Asian policy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal superiority as well. The sudden reversal of our position on the rearmament issue has had a drastic psychological effect. It has darkened the image of the United States in the minds of precisely those Japanese upon whom the hope for a peaceful Japan, friendly to the West, has largely rested. To these Japanese the United States appears now selfish, fallible, unreliable and, more particularly, bent upon letting Japanese fight their wars.

It hardly needs emphasis that this political devastation, inflicted upon us not by the enemy but by ourselves, has not occurred in a political vacuum. Our rearmament policy is being exploited for all it is worth by Marxists of all shades of opinion. More detrimental by far has been the connection which many Japanese have established between our insistence upon their rearmament and our entanglement with Communist China over the island of Formosa. While there is hardly a Japanese who does not favor the establishment of normal political and economic relations with Communist China, I have not found a single one who supports our Formosa policy. It is in this political and military context that we must put the rearmament of Japan, for it is in that context that the Japanese themselves see it. The coincidence of our China and rearmament policies suggests to them the ominous possibility of their involvement in a war against their will and their interests.

There are indeed situations in which a nation must take great political risks and incur great political liabilities for the sake of greater military advantage. The rearmament of Japan, however, is not one of them. It is the tragedy of our Japanese policy and the crowning monument to our folly that by identifying ourselves with the rearmament of Japan, we have created political conditions adverse to that very rearmament. Our very insistence upon it has made Japan reluctant to go on with it. It is hardly open to doubt that a sovereign Japan—conscious of her power, aware of her interests, and free to decide her own course of action in this as in other matters—would in the long-run have rearmed, in one form or the other, much more willingly than she does now and without being able to blame the United States for a step which she would have taken on her own initiative.

Military Value of Our Asian Allies

The same pattern of the payment of an exorbitant political price for insignificant or illusory military advantages is repeated in South Asia. Neither the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) nor the Baghdad Pact adds anything material to the strength of the West. All the nations concerned, with the exception of Iran, Pakistan and Thailand, were already members of one or the other Western military alignment before the conclusion of these pacts. Nothing needs to be said of the obvious military insignificance of Iran and Thailand, which would be liabilities rather than assets for whatever side they would join in case of actual war. A few words, however, need to be said about Pakistan, which is the strongest ally the United States has on the continent of Asia.

The military power of Pakistan is the measure of America's military power on that continent. Pakistan has a good army of more than 200,000 men and a population of close to 100 million. As a member of both the Baghdad Pact and SEATO she is the connecting link between the two defense organizations. Her government is as reliable and co-operative as that of any of our Asian allies.

The Underlying Weakness of Pakistan

But beneath these appearances of strength there is enormous and, so it seems, irremediable weakness. Pakistan is not a nation and hardly a state. It has no justification in history, ethnic origin, language, civilization, or the consciousness of those who make up its population. They have no interest in common save one: fear of Hindu domination. It is to that fear, and to nothing else, that Pakistan owes its existence, and thus far its survival, as an independent state.

When India gained her independence and the civil war between Hindus and Moslems ended, two regions, the western and easternmost parts of India, remained with a predominantly Moslem population. These two regions, West Pakistan with the capital Karachi, and East Bengal, form the state of Pakistan. It is as if after the Civil War Louisiana and Maryland had decided to form a state of their own with the capital in Baton Rouge. In fact, it is worse than that.

The two parts of Pakistan are separated not only by 1,200 miles of Indian territory, but even more by language, ethnic composition, civilization and outlook. West Pakistan belongs essentially to the Middle East and has more in common with Iran or Iraq than with East Bengal. East Bengal, in turn, with a population which is one-third Hindu is hardly distinguishable from West Bengal which belongs to India, and gravitates toward the latter's capital, Calcutta; the major labor unions in East Bengal, for instance, are run from Calcutta. The man in the street in West Pakistan speaks any one of four languages—none of which enables him to communicate with the Bengali-speaking inhabitants of East Bengal. A politician in Karachi who is able to address an East Bengal audience in its own tongue has a rare political asset. While 84 percent of the total population of Pakistan are illiterate, the literacy rate is much higher in East Bengal, which is also much more politically conscious and active than its western counterpart.

Even Jinnah, the creator of this strange state, did originally not believe in its viability, and there are few politicians in Karachi today who really believe in it. If there are solutions which could assure the future of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pakistan, only extraordinary wisdom and political skill will find them and put them into effect. If there is such wisdom and skill in Pakistan, it is not to be found among the politicians of Karachi. Thus it is hard to see how anything but a miracle, or else a revival of religious fanaticism, will assure Pakistan's future.

Against whom and how is an army likely to fight, which is built upon so tenuous a political foundation? Aside from the fact that the Karachi Government may well need its army to maintain its rule over the two disparate territories of Pakistan, geography allows of military operations only against two countries: Afghanistan and India. While the Pakistani army could easily take care of Afghanistan and might perhaps be able to defend West Pakistan against India at the price of the surrender of East Bengal, such capabilities are obviously meaningless in view of the over-all political and strategic situation on the continent of Asia as it appears from the vantage point of the United States. A local war between Pakistan and one or the other of its neighbors would not necessarily affect the interests of the United States to the point of requiring its intervention. A general war into which Pakistan would be drawn should see the United States on the side where her interests lie, which might or might not be the side of Pakistan.

In such a general war it is not very likely that the main issue would be joined where the Pakistani army happens to be. Geography makes it impossible for that army in case of war to give effective assistance to any of its allies either under the Baghdad Pact or SEATO or receive such assistance from them. The SEATO treaty appears to take that impossibility into account by stipulating in case of military attack against a member state not automatic military assistance (as NATO does), but only consultation, which would be likely to occur even without a formal legal commitment.

A Strategy of Alienation

The absurdity of these military alignments is surpassed only by the absurdity of their political consequences. By allying ourselves with Thailand, we have alienated Burma which is militarily and in view of the social and political dynamics of Asia infinitely more important than a stagnant country—by-passed by the Asian revolution, such as Thailand, which has been traditionally misgoverned to the satisfaction of its population. By allying ourselves with Pakistan, we have alienated India which for identical reasons is infinitely more important than our ally. The Baghdad Pact, far from erecting a barrier against Russian penetration of the Middle East, has given Egypt and the other Arab countries hostile to Iraq the incentive and the pretext to come to terms with each other and with the Soviet Union.

The political bankruptcy of this military policy is indeed complete. Yet the origins of that military policy, at least insofar as SEATO is concerned, shed a revealing light upon the general character of our foreign policy. It can be stated on excellent authority that when SEATO was conceived in the fall of 1954, it was intended not as a measure of military policy, but of psychological warfare. It was intended to counteract the psychological damage which the partition of Viet-Nam at the Geneva Conference of 1954 had inflicted upon the prestige of the West, the United States included. It was intended as a gesture of defiance, as an act which would convey the appearance of initiative and strength where actual initiative and strength were lacking. As such, SEATO was slated to take its place in that series of portentous yet hollow pronouncements which range from liberation and the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek through agonizing reappraisal and the "new look" to the brink of war.

Turning Our Weapon Against Us

Yet while SEATO is militarily hollow and politically pernicious, it is more than a unilateral pronouncement of the Secretary of State of the United States. It is a solemn undertaking to which the representatives of the member states have put their signatures. This circumstance imposes upon the United States additional liabilities, both economic and political. Our Asian allies make no bones about their intention to use SEATO as an entering wedge into the treasury of the United States. Since they are our allies, they must have first claim upon American financial support. As one of the most astute of our representatives in Asia put it to me: "This is like the Community Chest. Two agencies acting in concert can collect more than two agencies acting alone."

SEATO, thus having become an instrument of economic pressure, transforms itself in the hands of its Asian members into a political weapon directed against the United States. Since whatever economic and political support these allies receive can never be enough, they are in a position of threatening the United States with looking for support elsewhere. The success of Egypt in playing one side against the other has impressed Thailand and Pakistan. Strong neutralist tendencies have recently come to the surface in both countries. On his recent visit to Burma, the Prime Minister of Thailand went so far as to equate his country's membership in SEATO with membership in the United Nations. And on December 26 of last year the Karachi Provincial Muslim League called upon the government to revise its foreign policy, declaring it "a failure on the whole." The government of Pakistan has echoed these sentiments by complaining that the government of the United States does not support Pakistan strongly enough against India.

Thus in every respect our military policy in Asia is a failure. It is a failure in its own military terms, and it is a failure in the political consequences it has had for the relations with our potential friends and actual allies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books and Comment

The Self-Portrait of a President

I. Harry is Still Tough

by Gerald W. Johnson

HARRY was undoubtedly tough. If it comes to that, Harry is still tough. This, the second volume of his memoirs, is something that an alligator could get his teeth into and know that he had bitten into a substantial article. All the prudish old women of both sexes and both parties are screaming scandal, as they screamed in Andrew Jackson's time; but with not much more effect on those who know the political facts of life.

Years of Trial and Hope (Memoirs, II), by Harry S. Truman (Doubleday; $5).

They are charging the ex-President with distortion of history and, of course, the charge is true. This is the way Truman saw things, and any one man's view of the historical process is bound to be distorted because the human mind is limited. But the impact of the book is due, not to its judicial tone, but to the reader's strong impression that this man believes every word that he wrote. Grant his sincerity, and grant his indomitable courage, and all the rest follows as logically as a demonstration by Euclid.

Of course it does not follow that he was always right. Like the rest of us, Harry had his mental quirks and they led him astray more than once. For instance, it seems to this reviewer that he vastly over-estimated the late Chief Justice Vinson. Vinson was a much abler man than his enemies will admit, but he was not the towering world statesman that Truman thought him, and it was this misunderstanding that led Truman to contemplate seriously sending Vinson to talk with Stalin at a critical moment.

In many quarters it is firmly and carefully forgotten that Truman did not send Vinson to Russia. As soon as the Secretary of State, then George C. Marshall, disapproved the idea the President dropped it; but some Judas around the White House had already leaked the plan to the press and Truman was denounced as violently as if he had carried it through.

This illustrates another curious feature of the administration. No other President except John Adams has been as consistently and cheerfully betrayed as Harry S. Truman. He wore more knives in his back than a porcupine wears quills, most of them planted there by relatively small fry in his own official household. The probable explanation is that he took over the organization suddenly and it included, especially on the lower levels, many Roosevelt idolaters who would have felt contempt for any man who followed FDR. Being small-minded, they could not realize that in laying Truman open to his enemies they were joining the tribe of Iscariot.

There is no mention of this in the book, but again and again there is a record of how delicate negotiations were wrecked by a leak, sometimes to the press, sometimes to hostile Congressmen, sometimes to foreign governments. Yet the only sharp resentment Truman exhibits is toward leaks, not *to* but *by* Congressmen. Evidently he didn't expect much from clerks and office-boys, but he did think that members of Congress should be reasonably discreet.

THE passage of the book of greatest current interest comes right at the end, where Truman discusses Adlai Stevenson's campaign in 1952. This is plain-spoken to a degree that has enraged some of Stevenson's friends. In this reviewer's opinion part of it is wrong. Stevenson, running against a national hero, yet contrived to win 27 million votes. Truman says that by more careful attention to the party organization,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meaning the professionals, he might have had three million more. It could be; but it also could be that by kowtowing to the party bosses Stevenson might have lost five million independents, which would have left him worse off than ever.

But not all of Truman's criticism is wrong. Some of it is very much to the point. For one thing, Stevenson did hesitate too long about making the race. He did not sufficiently appreciate the necessity of the build-up. He was too little acquainted with the wheel-horses in the party organization. All this he has virtually admitted by his conduct in the present campaign, when he has been doing, with great diligence, what Truman says he should have done in 1952.

HARRY S. TRUMAN is not a literary man and his book lacks professional polish, yet now and then it includes passages that are startlingly good merely as writing. For instance, he came to the Democratic National Convention to make his acceptance speech in 1948 only to find the convention tangled in that row over the "loyalty" oath by which idealists vainly imagined they could convert life-long Southern Republicans labeled as Democrats into real Democrats. So the President had to wait until the fight was over.

It was a hot night, so he took refuge on a balcony outside the convention hall; and there, looking out over the city of Philadelphia, where the Constitution was written, he meditated on the thirty-three men who had held the office of President of the United States, considering each in turn.

There follows the most brilliant thumb-nail history of the Presidency with which I am acquainted. For example, "Franklin Pierce was a good-looking man from New Hampshire who did not have to work for the Presidency in 1852." There he is, complete. No word need be added to make it a portrait of the most obscure of the Presidents.

As a literary product the book is heavily overloaded with speeches and documents. Most of them are important, and all of them bear directly on the point under discussion. In spite of the official documents, it is the most vivid self-portrait ever drawn by a President and it will be indispensable to future historians.

What manner of man, then, is Truman as seen by himself? Not perfect, by a great deal, not divinely inspired, and not any too wise, but straightforward, honest and bold. More than that, while he could be dreadfully wrong in trivialities, his great decisions have been justified by events. Probably he will never rank along with the Big Six, Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt, but among the near-great Presidents his rank is high. Here is one opinion that he is already crowding John Adams for the top place in the second division.

II. How the Memoirs Were Written

by Webster Schott

IF you want to shake his hand or look at the rug given him by the Shah of Persia, Harry Truman is one of the easiest persons to see in Kansas City. And the people who stop by with this sort of thing in mind are many.

But I found him less accessible. I wanted to ask him about how a former President goes about writing his memoirs. Telephone calls were of no use; he would not see me when I visited his office; his secretary warned me I should not try to keep his note of refusal. The only way to present my request—a short interview to gather factual information—was to stand in the hall of the Federal Reserve Bank Building and follow him to the men's room.

The answer there, in a firm voice from a quick-moving little man with an aged face, was "No—my contract won't let me." Then he was gone. (Mr. Truman was referring to the contract which gave *Life* all rights to his memoirs for around $600,000.) Further telephone calls did no good.

But since this refusal shortly before the first volume was published, Mr. Truman has shown that his contract is not quite so restrictive. In *The New Yorker* last November, Philip Hamberger's quaint report on the Muehlebach Hotel autographing party quoted Mr. Truman frequently on the subject of the memoirs, mostly about the strain of writing them. For understandable reasons of personal pride Mr. Truman does not want to consider the memoirs as a staff project. To discuss them during an interview in terms of who did what might detract from his authorship.

Nevertheless it's true that the memoirs involved virtually all of the important figures of his administration—some of whom flew in and out of Kansas City twenty times or more for conferences with The Chief during the writing. Reviews of the memoirs generally avoid exploring the help Mr. Truman has had on the project. It has been plain to all that he had neither a Mark Twain by his side, as Grant did, nor a Robert Sherwood, as Roosevelt did; yet, when the definitive biography of Harry S. Truman is written, there will have to be a season of digging in Kansas City to find out exactly how extensive, reliable, and professional the assistance he received was. Considering that Mr. Truman is not much of a writer himself, it's remarkable how little help he did have.

MR. TRUMAN started the memoirs on his Honolulu vacation in April of 1953, dictating to a tape recorder. But that didn't work, and from the time of his return until the second volume was finished last summer, all dictation was given to his two former White House secretaries, Frances Myers and Rose Conway, and to a male secretary from San Francisco, Eugene Bailey.

The two most important associate architects of the memoirs were William Hillman, compiler of the book *Mr. President* and manager of the *Collier's* Washington bureau during the Truman administration, and David Noyes, a member of Donald Nelson's War Production Board and retired Lord & Thomas advertising man. They helped work out the original outline and sat in on the conferences with Dean Acheson, Samuel Rosenman, Averell Harriman, Matthew Connelly, Charles Brannan, Sam Rayburn, John Snyder, and many others during luncheons in Mr. Truman's Muehlebach private dining room. They helped hire the researchers and writers. Hillman's influence was probably the greatest because he also acted as Mr. Truman's literary agent. He helped negotiate the *Life* contract, had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in office in the Time-Life Building in New York, and saw more of *Life's* editors than Mr. Truman did.

David Noyes hired the first full-time writers: Robert E. G. Harris, professor of journalism at UCLA, and Harris' assistant, a professional writer from Los Angeles named Robert Goe. Five months and 280,000 words later they left Kansas City, in November of 1953. Harris wanted to arrange the memoirs according to major topics; Hillman, exercising greater stewardship over the memoirs at the start than at the finish, wanted them written chronologically. Hillman won. It's obvious that the first year of writing was a critical time. In the summer of 1953 Edward Thompson, managing editor of *Life*, visited Kansas City to check on what kind of product the magazine was going to get, and in the winter of 1954 Ernest Havemann, staff writer and a former editor of *Life*, spent three weeks in Kansas City studying what had been written.

Whether by intent or accident, Mr. Truman's successive writer-researchers never met one another on the job. After the departure of Harris and Goe, Dr. Morton William Royce, author of *Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare* (1928) and a former professor of political science at the Georgetown University school of foreign service, joined Mr. Truman's staff and stayed until the spring of 1954. Then in May, Dr. Francis H. Heller came.

An associate professor of political science at the University of Kansas and author of *The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States* (1951) and *Introduction to American Constitutional* Law (1952), Heller worked for Mr. Truman until the completed manuscript was turned over to *Life* early in July of last year. Ironically, he was recommended to Mr. Truman by one of the more enthusiastic early supporters of Eisenhower, Dr. Franklin Murphy, chancellor of the University of Kansas.

HELLER was by far the most satisfactory man Mr. Truman found for the spadework of the memoirs. He was devoted to his task, performed while he continued to hold classes at nearby Lawrence, Kansas; he did not try to assume responsibility for the scope and form of the memoirs; he was reliable and quiet. None of the reporters covering Mr. Truman in Kansas City had ever heard of Francis Heller until after the memoirs were published. Previous assistants (not Harris, Goe, or Royce) seem to have caused some minor embarrassment and discomfort with comments at cocktail parties, over-extended checking accounts, and loose habits with documents.

LIKE that of his predecessors, Heller's work in Mr. Truman's suite on the eleventh floor of the Federal Reserve Bank Building was inglorious and demanding. Working from conference notes, a complete file of the *New York Times*, Mr. Truman's dictation and memoranda, documents sifted from around 200 cabinets of Truman papers, Heller was researcher and writer, copy boy and clerk. He took part in round table discussions which went before important sections of the memoirs, searched for elusive bits of paper, gathered up the documentation that went with the periods being covered, wove the fragments into a literary whole.

Altogether Mr. Truman worked on the memoirs full time, from 9 until 4, five days a week, for thirty months. His dictation would have been sufficient for around a million words. But his *Life* contract called for a book of some 500,000. Accompanying Mr. Truman home from his office each afternoon was a small aluminum carrying case. It usually held his staff's production for the day. He and Mrs. Truman read the manuscript at night. The next day it was returned to Heller or the typists with notes and changes penciled in the margins in his or Mrs. Truman's handwriting. Occasionally he would turn over a new draft of his own. "He is a good copy editor," one of his early writers told me. "His notes were very perceptive."

That there were extensive revisions as the work progressed seems fairly obvious, and Mr. Truman jumped the gun several times in announcing when he expected to be finished with the job. Too, he complained to friends about the drudgery of the work and monopolization of his time.

But the Truman memoirs were written with a heavy reliance on the simple declarative sentence, and no conscious effort was made during Francis Heller's time, at least, to approximate Mr. Truman's style. The job was primarily to get it all down on paper. Still Mr. Truman tried to impress on his writers that there were certain words and constructions that he was not in the habit of using. One note to Heller read, for example: "I may be old fashioned, but I don't end sentences with prepositions."

Most matters of style were resolved during the last review of the manscript with Hillman, Noyes, and Heller. Most of them were settled, according to Heller, with Mr. Truman taking a pencil and saying, "I think I would say it this way . . . " Two months after the job had been finished, Heller's "overwhelming recollection" was that there was "actually not a thing in the memoirs that isn't Mr. Truman's—that he didn't personally touch." During the six weeks of the final reading of the manuscript, Mr. Truman worked like a horse, Heller says. Often, late in the afternoon after Mrs. Truman had called asking when he was coming home, Mr. Truman would tell his staff, "I just can't stand it any more," then get up, put on his floppy Panama and drive home to Independence.

IF YOU stop at the office with the impersonal businesslike furnishings and the block-lettered "Harry S. Truman" on the door, and if you talk to his efficient and wary secretaries, and if you happen to catch a glimpse of the stocky occupant of the inner office and the walls of padlocked filing cabinets you may come away asking yourself the questions historians and biographers must eventually ask about the Truman memoirs: How effectively were the great difficulties of documentation met? How much reliance was placed on Mr. Truman's memory and the memories of his cabinet officers? What were the influences of William Hillman and David Noyes on the form the memoirs took place? What kind of pressure did a $600,000 contract place on a man whose only assured income is less than $100 a month as a retired reserve officer. How much were the books influenced by the requirements of magazine serialization? And what is Mr. Truman's conception of a former President's obligation to history?

These are things one would like to ask Mr. Truman — after shaking his hand and seeing the rug given to him by the Shah of Persia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Graves in Dock — The Case for Modern Poetry

by Delmore Schwartz

ROBERT GRAVES' articles on the idols of modern poetry—"These Be Thy Gods, O Israel" (*New Republic*, February 27 and March 5)—require a response if only because of their numerous errors of fact. It might be best to say something first about what a wonderful thing it is to be a literary critic: a literary critic can say anything. And when he has said anything, he can say something else. And if he is accused of inconsistency, he can always reply that he has changed his mind.

Mr. Graves' animadversions are only one more instance of a traditional tendency of literary criticism, one which may well be called its conspicuous presumption or its unconscionable arrogance. Thus, on the most exalted heights there are such typical instances as Turgenev's comment on Dostoevsky's fiction, that it was the product of a "morbid mediocrity." What Dostoevsky said of Turgenev's novels is too shameless to be set down again. And to round out the picture of temperamental self-indulgence among writers of the greatest genius, Turgenev and Tolstoy came very close to fighting a duel in which one might have killed the other before either had written most of his best work. So too, to come closer to the period about which Mr. Graves is writing, T. S. Eliot, after many years of principled dispraise of Milton's poetry, decided that there was a great deal to be said in praise of Milton's verse after all, adding, with candor which was refreshing, that his previous views had been those of a practising poet who had been motivated by the natural desire to propagandize for the kind of poetry he himself was writing at the time.

It may or may not be worthwhile to mention some of Mr. Graves' simple errors of fact, since the tenor of his condemnation is a far more serious distortion of the truth. Yeats, Pound, Eliot, Auden and Dylan Thomas are not a school of poets in any literary sense or any sense that a literary historian would regard as valid. When Yeats was a young man, he wrote in a vague and romantic style which made him famous and then forgotten until he developed the bare and spare colloquial idiom which made him, in late middle age, one of the greatest of all poets in the language, and caused a good many of the admirers of his youthful work to feel that the poems which he wrote at the height of his powers were hardly the recognizable work of the same author.

Graves himself has suffered as a remarkable and important poet and novelist from a fate like that of Yeats: the admirers of his early poems were dismayed as he developed an original style, and the more original and genuine his work became, the more his early admirers regretted the Georgian tinkling of his youth. At about the same time he began to write excellent fiction too. And as a result, a good many readers did not and don't know that he has ever written poems at all.

I BELIEVE that Mr. Graves lives in Majorca, a fact which has as much to do with his work as his statement that Ezra Pound is "an Idaho poet"—which is a fact and a falsehood at the same time, since Pound was born in Idaho, but left long before the far West could exert any influence upon his writing. In the same way it may or may not be true that Pound is "Longfellow's grandnephew." This is news and as insignificant as most news: Mr. Graves may be one of the results of a marriage between Lord Tennyson and that White Goddess discovered or fabricated by Mr. Graves; and he himself may live in a tearoom on the Canary Islands: genealogy has nothing whatever to do with a judgment of the poetry of Graves or Pound. When Graves does remember that he is writing criticism, he speaks of Pound's *Cantos* as unmelodious, a falsehood which a few quotations would immediately demonstrate, and he indulges himself in a new and fashionable tendency, one which can be called anti-anti-Semitism, an expression of critical demagoguery which he renews when he comes to the poetry of Eliot.

At this point errors of fact as well as judgment become most frequent. Graves speaks of Eliot's *The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock* as having been inspired in London where "he was bored to screaming by tea-parties," ("this reaction accounts for *Prufrock*") though that justly famous poem was written long before Eliot arrived in London, and then he speaks of Pound's literary influence upon Eliot as if it were a crime! This is the worst error in his entire essay: such influence is not only *not* criminal but it combines with the "polyglot" learning in both Eliot and Pound to make both poets awake, in their work, to the international dimension of modern experience. Mr. Graves himself cannot be wholly unaware of this experience since his best fiction is historical and he has written one of the most eloquent of all autobiographies, *Goodbye to All That*, in which he recounts his agonized suffering during the First World War and mentions the influence, literary and otherwise, of Gertrude Stein, Laura Riding and Sigmund Freud. Each of these enjoyed the benefits of that international dimension of modern life which can be summarized in a sign I once saw on a florist's storefront: "Flowers telegraphed to all parts of the world." The flowers of poetry and fiction in English have become more and more international; some of the most gifted new writers in English are Anglo-Irish, Anglo-Indian, West Indian, South African, or like Gertrude Stein, Americans and Jews.

PERHAPS it is possible to regard Graves' dismissal of Eliot's poetry as a matter of taste. In any case what he has to say about *The Waste Land* as a meaningless *collage* is too inaccurate to be discussed at length, and what he says has as much to do with the authentic meaningfulness of *The Waste Land* and the great beauty of *Ash Wednesday*—which he scorns to mention—as his saying Pound is plump, "ill-at-ease and soft-spoken" has to do with the quality of Pound's poems at their best or their worst.

The confusion increases when Mr. Graves moves on to Auden and Thomas as the fourth and fifth of the false idols. Mr. Graves first began to accuse Auden of "borrowing" lines from Laura Riding some twenty-five years ago and it may well be called an obsession, even though he now restricts himself to speaking of Auden as a writer who is "as synthetic as Milton," a soft impeachment indeed. One of his two examples

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of what he calls borrowing from Miss Riding is an early poem which Auden has never reprinted; the other does not look like borrowing at all. Whether or not it is, Mr. Graves is in no position to speak of those who borrowed from Miss Riding, since for a number of years his borrowing was so wholesale and unfortunate that it often was impossible to decide which poet had written which poem, but it was certainly very clear that both had been "borrowing" a good deal from Gertrude Stein.

In any case, the question of borrowing is a peculiar one as Mr. Graves seems to recognize, since he is polite enough to call it "synthetic" and not "plagiarism," as he did in the past time and again. Shakespeare was "synthetic," he was even more of a synthetic plagiarist than Milton, lifting passages from Plutarch, Montaigne and his own contemporaries to such an extent that scholars continue to have a Roman holiday of disputation about which lines Shakespeare himself wrote. And the truth, as Mr. Graves must know, is that imitation, derivation and assimilation are all so much a part of most writers' development that the absence of such relationships is most often a sign of ignorance, lack of talent, and a will to be a poet rather than a desire to write poetry. The only question about any instance of "the synthetic" or derivation is whether the poet has improved what he has borrowed.

Mr. Graves gives himself away when he speaks of Picasso, for, as in Pound and Eliot, as in Shakespeare and Milton, whatever is borrowed is transformed, and no one who is perceptive and interested would mistake a wooden mask from the Congo for the work of Picasso. Here again, in all these modern human beings, including Mr. Graves, the reason for so many international sources of inspiration is that modern experience and awareness has become pan-historical and world-wide to an extent far greater than that of any past epoch and for clearly modern reasons such as railroads, steamships, airplanes and archæological research, the advances of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the like, to say little of the growing sense of the whole of literature and the unity of peoples and nations.

When Mr. Graves comes to the poetry of Dylan Thomas, he surpasses himself in confusion and trivial irrelevance. Having reported his comment on Thomas' poems at sixteen—they are "irreproachable," he wrote Thomas—they have become conventional and artificial by the end of the same paragraph, and "a defect in sincerity" by the beginning of the next, a defect which led Thomas to concentrate on sound and ignore meaning in his later work.

Mr. Graves then makes some peculiar remarks about beer and concludes with two examples of the worst error any literary critic can make: quotation. He quotes several lines by Thomas to show that his verse is meaningless, which it is not, and adds a critical pronouncement by Stephen Spender in 1946, which is the most lamentable error of all. For Spender, writing of Thomas' growing popularity, indicates that his work has succeeded in diminishing the admiration felt for Auden and for Pound and Eliot as well. But Mr. Graves, fixed on the notion that the five poets he is attacking are idols, has said nothing to indicate that Thomas represented, among his other gifts, a romantic reaction to the ascendancy first of Eliot and then of Auden, both of whom were inspired by intellectual motives and by social criticism, though in very different ways. And no reader would know merely by reading Mr. Graves' article, that the five idols in question belong to four different generations of poetry. No one would know that they had written during an age of apocalyptic change and that they had been influenced by such writers as Joyce, Proust, Rilke and Kafka, among a good many others, who, granted Mr. Graves' point of view, must also be called idols.

Mr. Graves is an important writer and everything he writes is worth reading, though not always for the reasons which made him write. He is always sincere, but perhaps sincerity is an over-rated virtue. Certainly Mr. Graves' essay suggests that it can become a vice; it also suggests the formula of a French critic: literature is a bull fight. It is not. And when many years ago, in 1924, Mr. Graves wrote *A Survey of Modernist Poetry* with Laura Riding, his purpose was to defend modern poetry from the Philistine attacks of those who accused modern poetry of the very sins which Mr. Graves himself now accuses it. That book is still one of the best elucidations of the meaningfulness of modern poetry.

Mr. Graves also makes use, in that book, and in some of his best fiction, of the very historical sense which he ignores in his essay. The reader of that book can hardly fail to recognize that the first important thing is not that some modern poets are, for a time, much admired, but that all modern poets are read at present far more than they were some 30 years ago. Modern poetry, for all its differences, certainly has freed writing in English from the shackles of the past, and there is every reason to believe that Mr. Graves himself has been liberated along with many others.

Correspondence

► The Old Majorcan Shepherd

SIRS:

"Raineth drop and staineth slop,/And how the wind doth ramm!/Sing: Goddamm." Robert Graves is at it again. The last time I remember him in these pages he was quartering the flayed carcass of one Mr. Aldington, because that gentleman wrote a book popping the mythological bubble surrounding T. E. Lawrence. Mr. Graves hates a bubble buster when he has helped to create the bubble.

Considerable space is consumed in two issues of *The New Republic* by Robert Graves' window breaking. Yeats is disposed of by claiming he had "nothing to say." What were all the nothings he wrote about then? Those, says Mr. Graves, were pieces of wool from his neighbor's sheep. Yeats is then accused of employing the non sequitur. Graves and Riding fixed him good, though, when they declined to contribute to his anthology. O woeful anthology.

The key to Ezra Pound's hatred of America has been found. He was fired by a small mid-Western college "where he had been teaching English Literature," because of his academic inaptitude. If scholar Graves would check a volume entitled "Wabash College, the First Hundred Years" by T. G. Gronert and R. E. Banta, he would find that Pound taught Modern Language, and was released by the college's Board of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trustees for what might be called extreme Bohemianism. A destitute "show" girl was stranded in town, and he gave the lady his bed for the night. The good man arose from his couch and made off for his eight o'clock lecture, leaving his slumbering ward to be awakened by the brace of old maids who served as his landladies. The trustees were called into session, and Pound made a graceful exit to the lodgings of T. E. Lawrence, where he greeted Robert Graves "with the limpest of handshakes." Maybe Pound wasn't a "brawny, loud-voiced, swashbuckling American," but he was a man capable of an act of purest poetry.

Graves says Pound is "Longfellow's grand-nephew," and knows no Latin, Greek, or Chinese. The one thing he doesn't tell is why the "grand-nephew of Longfellow" doesn't write good poetry.

We learn that T. S. Eliot was the first college-poet, although an anti-Jewish one. He was also "Pound-foolish," "briefly, a poet," and refused to publish a Graves book. Which is the most grievous fault? Eliot also wanted Graves to intercede for Pound with the United States. Mr. Graves, however, wants it strictly understood that he does not "interfere with the domestic affairs of another nation." As a sovereign state, mythologist Graves is willing to let other nations indulge in poetic license.

There is a conspiracy afoot! W. H. Auden made the top of the heap by stealing from Laura Riding. He has reformed a bit recently, and makes his livelihood by a series of petty thieveries consisting of "a rhetorical trope," an "ingenious rhyme," "a classical reference," and "a metrical arrangement." Would someone please match up for me the "half lines" and "whole lines" that Auden borrowed, as I can't seem to do it. Picasso is a big yegg too. He swipes inspirations from such diverse articles as "a Hittite seal," or "an Aztec calendar." Above all, let's not use ideas from classical or pre-historical times — Robert Graves wouldn't think of it. Oh, to have Homer read Graves.

RODGERS & HAMMERSTEIN'S
NEW MUSICAL SMASH HIT
PIPE DREAM
SHUBERT THEA., W. 44 St. Mats. Wed. & Sat.

Was Dylan Thomas "a great Christian gentleman?" It's funny, but when I think of Dylan Thomas that question never seems to come up. He is accused of writing seven lines of nonsense. A commendable record for a poet.

Robert Graves says that the five greatest contemporary poets are very poor poets. Most of the other modern poets write very much like one of the five poor poets, so they are poor poets too. Who then is writing good poetry? Give me a G; give me an R; give me an A; give me an.....! The more one reads these two articles the more they sound like the outraged lamentations of a paranoid. . . . The old Majorcan shepherd missed his mark this time . . . that is, if he ever knew the mark.

W. M. LAETSCH
Stanford, California

". . . his feeble best"

. . . By way of a poorly directed thrust Mr. Graves has actually enhanced the fortification of the already fortified. No heads have fallen, except possibly his own. And not one of the five reputations (Yeats, Pound, Eliot, Auden and Dylan Thomas) he has done his feeble best to vilify, has been left with so much as a single blemish on its immortal skin. Nothing is smashed, while the smasher has taken on the appearance of a *very ordinary* man with a chip on his shoulder.

. . . We have a right to expect something far more competent from the man who gave us *Collected Poems 1955, The White Goddess, I Claudius,* etc. . . .

JACK LINDEMAN
Philadelphia, Pa.

". . . his courageous iconoclasm"

Much as Mr. Graves deserves gratitude for his courageous iconoclasm, I should like to take exception to his strictures on "borrowing." W. H. Auden improved on Laura Riding's verse; he was under no obligation to be "original," but worked as an honest craftsman does: using his skill to say better what moved him and his contemporaries. As Mr. Graves graciously acknowledges, Milton did the same thing, and if he cared he might prove that Shakespeare borrowed in the same way, not only from published works but from "rolls" that existed at the Globe Theatre. What matters, it seems to me, is the fact that in the process of such borrowing an expression eventually acquires its highest intensity or beauty—what we call a classical form.

Mr. Graves rightly says that "appreciation" means "evaluation," and in evaluating we must approach a work of art as though we knew nothing of its author and its antecedents. By injecting Mr. Auden's activities in Spain into a discussion of his poetic achievement Mr. Graves lowers himself to the level of those who praise the poet on the basis of his political opinions. His use of this device is particularly distressing in view of his brilliant execution of Ezra Pound; in that case he implied the insincerity of Pound's politics by showing up the insincerity of his verse.

Why did Mr. Graves choose the opposite method in the case of Auden? Apparently Mr. Graves wished to say that virtuosity and craftsmanship are not enough; that to be a master, a poet should have something to say, and his form should fit his idea. He rightly deplores the emptiness of much contemporary poetry and art, its decorative playfulness and polished effect-hunting, its basic gentility under the guise of rebelliousness. All this needed to be said, indeed; but *then*—*why not say it?*

HENRY M. PACHTER
New York City

". . . a sideswipe at Lindsay"

William Butler Yeats is not one of my favorites so I won't try to defend him from Graves' charge that the Irish poet had no ideas and was forced to steal from his contemporaries. I'll bet a dozen other Irishmen rush to his defense in *NR's* columns. What I objected to was his using Yeats as an excuse for taking a sideswipe at Vachel Lindsay. This American troubador should not be held in contempt because he lacked money enough to retire to the fleshpots of Majorca. Although Lindsay "hawked his own ballads around the country," an unkind way of saying the poet had to sing for his supper, his method of deriving a livelihood did not detract from his onomatopaeic powers. I have become something of an expert on "The Congo" since acquiring a writer friend who after four highballs can't resist reciting it, with gestures. And I have never heard anyone, drunk or sober, with or without gestures, recite one of Graves' poems.

RIDGELY CUMMINGS
Los Angeles, California

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Psychiatrist Comments

The Root of an Evil

IT IS ONE of the curious paradoxes of modern medicine that the psychiatrist can hardly afford to work for fees which the patient can afford to pay. This bizarre state of affairs arises out of the fact that the psychotherapeutic contact is the only medical procedure which consistently and repeatedly requires the unflagging, full-time attention of a physician for a full hour. In an hour, a psychotherapist can see one patient, a dermatologist can see five. If the dermatologist charges $5 a visit, he earns $25 an hour. The median psychiatric fee is $15 an hour. The typical psychotherapist wants to see his patient three times a week, the dermatologist is satisfied with two visits a month. Figure it out for yourself.

In their most recent survey, the magazine *Medical Economics* finds that psychiatrists, in terms of gross income, are at the absolute bottom of the list of all specialties. Psychiatry is, in fact, the poorest paying specialty in medicine.

Incidentally a $15-an-hour income does not mean a $600 a week income. The psychiatrist actually has to divert more of his professional time to non-revenue-producing activities than do most other specialists. And since he is already low man on the totem pole when it comes to physicians' incomes, the psychiatrist can hardly be expected to cut his fees any more.

But what of the patient? Average income for an American family today is, perhaps, $65 a week. Obviously this average family cannot, for long, afford $45 a week for psychiatric office service. Which brings us back to the paradox: the average American cannot afford to pay fees for which the psychiatrist in private practice can afford to work.

This is concealed at the moment by the fact that enough Americans are earning enough money to keep busy the 3,500 or 4,000 psychiatrists now in private practice. If a psychiatrist does psychotherapy only, and if he keeps to the three-visits-a-week desideratum, then his total case load can scarcely exceed 15 or 20 patients. Thus, the psychiatrists now in private practice in the four corners of the nation, taken altogether, can handle, perhaps 60,000 or 65,000 patients. At that point their appointment books fill up. Since there are obviously many more neurotics than that in this country, there will always be more than enough in the upper-middle and upper-upper income brackets to keep these practitioners busy. Thus, the psychiatrist has enough trouble handling the patient who *can* afford his fees, to keep him from worrying about those who can't.

But how about the 100,000 neurotics —or maybe 500,000, no one knows— who cannot afford $15 fees whether the contact is once, twice or three times a week? Where can they go?

The present possibilities are these. The prime resource is the family doctor —the general practitioner. He sees the patient as a whole, and his fees are modest. He knows the family background and he usually has a lot of common sense. But he lacks technique and he also lacks time. He averages 31 patients a day, and at this rate, the troubled neurotic is not going to get the unhurried attention he deserves. Although general practitioners now have a better psychiatric orientation than at any time in history, they cannot be expected to wield psychotherapy as a precision instrument. And doing psychotherapy is like doing surgery without an anesthetic.

How about Blue Shield or other forms of health insurance? Well, the actuarial structure of this type of insurance is such that it cannot support a fee schedule of more than $3, $4 or possibly $5 per visit, if the visits are going to be very frequent. Blue Shield doesn't object to paying $150 for an appendectomy, but you can't persuade them to pay $15 a visit for ten visits to the psychiatrist's office for an obsessional neurosis. Even if you could, it wouldn't help much. The appendicitis is cured by $150 worth of surgery. The obsessional neurosis is not going to be cured by ten psychotherapeutic interviews. So health insurance, as it looks today, is not the answer.

Clinics? This is the ideal solution if our communities could establish enough of them. The modern mental hygiene clinic (not, mind you, the old-fashioned "nervous disease dispensary") is staffed by teams of psychiatrists, social workers and psychologists. It sees patients by appointment only, and it sees each patient as often as necessary. It *can* provide a high grade of psychotherapy. But it still burns up top-skill professional time at the rate of one professional person per patient per hour, and some one has to pay for that. If the patient pays only low rates, there will be a whopping deficit. Thus, if the patient can pay $5 a week for two visits, while the clinic has to pay $10 an hour for its staff, then every hour means an income of $2.50 and a payroll outgo of $10, not to mention overhead expenses. So the community has to make up the difference . . . either through tax money or through contributions to the Community Chest or to the sponsoring agency. A one-team clinic (one each: psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, clerk) costs from $30,000 to $50,000 a year and has a pretty limited case-load potential.

Group therapy is another possibility, and while this has enormous advantages in selected cases, there is still need for a good deal of individual, patient-to-therapist treatment.

While the drive for better psychiatric outpatient facilities is a worthy one, there has to be some realistic thinking about the basic economic dilemma. Without free choice of therapist, psychotherapy is of uncertain value. And there is, as yet, no bargain basement in free choice.

HENRY A. DAVIDSON, M.D.

TO AUTHORS
seeking a publisher

Send for our free, illustrated booklet titled **To the Author in Search of a Publisher.** Tells how we can publish, promote and distribute your book. All subjects considered. New authors welcome. Write today for booklet RP. It's free.

VANTAGE PRESS, INC., 120 W. 31 St., N. Y. 1
In Calif.: 6253 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood 28
In Wash., D. C.: 1010 Vermont Ave., N.W.

BRITISH BOOKS—ALL SUBJECTS. Catalogue free. Wants solicited. Transbooks, Box 22-NR, Brooklyn 26, N. Y.

LET ME FIND THE BOOK YOU WANT
Madeleine Swarte, 122 South Third Avenue, Mount Vernon, New York

SELL US YOUR BOOKS at your price. Oster's Dept. D, Box 111, Times Square Station, New York 36, N. Y.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FREE

YOUR CHOICE OF ANY ONE OF THESE SETS OF

THREE 12" COLUMBIA (LP) RECORDS

If you join the Columbia (LP) Record Club now—and agree to accept as few as 4 selections during the coming 12 months

3-RECORD SET #1

Treasury of Great Classics



Eugene Ormandy conducting The Philadelphia Orchestra

TCHAIKOVSKY
Symphony No. 6 "Pathetique"

Sir Thomas Beecham, Bart., conducting the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra

BEETHOVEN SYMPHONY NO. 8

SCHUBERT SYMPHONY NO. 8 "Unfinished"

Bruno Walter Conducting the Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra of New York

BRAHMS Variations on a Theme by Haydn
WAGNER Siegfried Idyll **SMETANA** The Moldau —Academic Festival Overture

3-RECORD SET #3

TREASURY OF GREAT MOOD MUSIC



STRAUSS WALTZES by
ANDRE KOSTELANETZ
Andre Kostelanetz and his Orchestra play ten waltzes.

IN THE DANCING MOOD
LES BROWN ☆ ERROLL GARNER
HARRY JAMES ☆ LES BROWN
PERCY FAITH ☆ SAMMY KAYE
America's most popular orchestras play your favorite music for dancing. 12 numbers in all.

AMONG MY SOUVENIRS
PAUL WESTON and his Orchestra
Dreamy arrangements of *Embraceable You, Pennies From Heaven, I'll See You Again,* and more.

3-RECORD SET #2

JAZZ HALL OF FAME

BRUBECK JAZZ GOES TO COLLEGE

Jazz At Columbia — Swing

☆ Benny Goodman ☆ Harry James
☆ Gene Krupa ☆ Duke Ellington
☆ Charlie Barnet ☆ Buck Clayton
☆ Count Basie ☆ Lionel Hampton



Jazz At Columbia — Collector's Items

☆ Bix Beiderbecke ☆ Louis Armstrong ☆ Bessie Smith
☆ Red McKenzie ☆ Eddie Condon ☆ Wally Rose
☆ Bunk Johnson ☆ Pete Johnson
☆ Jimmy Lunceford ☆ Teddy Wilson

These 3 records are a jazz library in themselves — presenting jazz greats of every period and style.

3-RECORD SET #4

BROADWAY HALL OF FAME

THE PAJAMA GAME
(Original Broadway Cast Recording)
Starring John Raitt, Janis Paige, Carol Haney, Eddie Foy Jr. — singing all the tunes from this musical.

SONGS TO REMEMBER
DOROTHY KIRSTEN

Percy Faith, Russell Case and Orchestras join Miss Kirsten in 15 songs.

BEWITCHED
MORTON GOULD
11 songs arranged and conducted by Morton Gould. Includes *September Song, So In Love, Where or When.*

MAIL THIS COUPON NOW!

COLUMBIA (LP) RECORD CLUB, Dept. 375
165 West 46th Street, New York 36, N. Y.

Please send me as my FREE gift the 3-Record Set checked here:

☐ Set #1. GREAT CLASSICS ☐ Set #3. GREAT MOOD MUSIC
☐ Set #2. JAZZ ☐ Set #4. BROADWAY HALL OF FAME

and enroll me in the following Division of the Club: (Check one box only)

☐ Classical ☐ Jazz ☐ Listening and Dancing
☐ Broadway, Movies, Television and Musical Comedies

Each month you will send me the Columbia (LP) Record Club Magazine which describes the records offered in all four Club divisions. I have the privilege of accepting the monthly selection in the division checked above, or any other selection described, or none at all. My only obligation is to accept a minimum of four records in the next twelve months at the regular list price plus a small mailing charge. After accepting four records, I will receive a free Bonus record for every two additional records I purchase. If not delighted with my membership, I may cancel within 10 days by returning all records.

Name.....
(Please print)
Address.....
City.....Zone....State.....

CANADA: Prices slightly higher. 11-13 Soho St., Toronto 2B

If you wish to have this membership credited to an established Columbia Records dealer, authorized to accept subscriptions, please fill in the following information:

Dealer's name.....
Dealer's address.....

Build a Fine Library of the World's Greatest Music—at Tremendous Savings!

Yes! You may have, FREE, any one of these valuable record sets, each containing *three* magnificent 12" Columbia (LP) records!

We make this unique offer to introduce you to the money-saving program of the Columbia (LP) Record Club . . . a program that selects for you each month the greatest works in every field of music — performed by the world's finest artists and reproduced with the astonishing brilliance for which Columbia (LP) records are famous!

HOW THE CLUB OPERATES

To enjoy the benefits of the Club's program—and to receive your 3-record set *free*—fill in and mail the coupon, indicating the Club division that best suits your musical taste: Classical; Jazz; Listening and Dancing; Broadway, Movies, Television and Musical Comedies.

Each month you will receive free the informative Club Magazine which describes the current selections in all four divisions. You may accept or reject the monthly selection for your division. You may also take records from other divisions, or you may tell us to send you NO record in any month.

Your only obligation as a member is to accept as few as four selections from the almost 100 that will be offered to you during the next 12 months, and you may cancel your membership at any time thereafter. The records you want are mailed to your home and billed to you at the low price of only $3.98 plus a small mailing charge.

FREE BONUS RECORDS GIVEN REGULARLY

The 3 records sent to you now represent an "advance" of the Club's bonus system—given to you at once. After you have fulfilled your membership obligation by purchasing four records, you will receive *an additional free Bonus record of your choice for every two additional Club selections you accept.* These 12" Columbia (LP) Bonus records are pressed *exclusively* for Club members in limited editions, not available elsewhere at any price!

CHOOSE YOUR 3-RECORD SET NOW

Indicate which 3-record set you want free, and the division you prefer. Then mail the coupon at once. You *must* be delighted with membership or you may cancel without obligation by returning the free set within 10 days.

COLUMBIA (LP) RECORD CLUB
165 West 46th St.
New York 36, N.Y.

® "Columbia", (LP) Marcas Reg. T.M

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED